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Argentina's Mystery of Capital:




In 1998, Argentina's economy was the model for successful
economic reform in a global economy.' The hyperinflation and
economic chaos that plagued the nation throughout the twenti-
eth century was effectively addressed by a plan reducing debt
and creating sustainable economic growth.' Argentine Presi-
dent Carlos Menem attributed his nation's success to a political
will to reform that allowed Argentina to work with international
lenders and to restructure the country's debt payments.3 Only
three years later, in December 2001, Argentina's economy col-
lapsed. The country went through three presidents in ten days,4
* J.D. candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2001, Augs-
burg College.
1. MICHAEL MUSSA, INST. FOR INT'L ECON., POLICY ANALYSES IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 67: ARGENTINA AND THE FUND: FROM TRIUMPH TO
TRAGEDY 1 (2002), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/files/chapters
_preview/343/liie339x.pdf ("[Firom mid-1997 to early 1998, Argentina became the
darling of emerging market finance...
2. Id. at 1-2.
3. President Carlos Saul Menem, Address at the 1998 Joint Annual Meeting
of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
Group (Oct. 6-8, 1998), in INT'L MONETARY FUND, SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS 10 (1998) ("In the
1990's we succeeded in transforming an economy ravaged by hyperinflation, specu-
lation, and systemic corruption. The keys to achieving this absolute economic mira-
cle were the political will to undertake the reforms ... and the coordination with
international institutions, which provided us with technical and financial support.").
4. MUSSA, supra note 1, at 53.
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its banks closed,5 and citizens rioted in the streets.'
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), which had worked
closely with Argentina, attempted to help the country with addi-
tional loans in 2000 and 2001.7 The IMF's efforts failed, how-
ever, and Argentina's economy soon fell into greater disarray.'
The IMF endeavor failed largely because Argentina could not
control its government spending, leading to an unsustainable
level of public debt.9 Now, as Argentina deals with its worst re-
cession since the 1930s, the IMF again looks to help the country
develop a long-term plan for sustainable economic growth.'0
Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto offers one model that
could help Argentina reform its economy. De Soto argues that
developing countries are not poor due to a lack of wealth; in-
stead, they lack a system for recognizing and managing capi-
tal. He points out that the poorest countries in the world are
sitting on economies worth at least $9.3 trillion, more than
twenty times the amount of direct foreign investment in devel-
oping countries worldwide." According to De Soto, developing
5. Id. at 2 (noting also that while the banks re-opened, they are still under
severe restrictions that have rendered the nation's banking system practically de-
funct since December 2001).
6. Hector Trobar, Argentina Declares Emergency Unrest, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20,
2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 28938267.
7. MUSSA, supra note 1, at 4-5.
8. See id. at 45, 49-50.
9. Id. at 10, 51 (finding the fundamental cause of Argentina's economic col-
lapse was "the large and persistent excess of public spending over recurring reve-
nues that led to unsustainable accumulation of public debt"). But see ALAN B.
CIBILS ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY AND RESEARCH, BRIEFING PAPER: ARGENTINA
SINCE DEFAULT: THE IMF AND THE DEPRESSION 10-11 (Sept. 3, 2002), available at
http://www.cepr.net/Argentina.%20PDF.PDF (arguing that the IMF played a promi-
nent role in mandating the policies that led to Argentina's economic collapse and
political turmoil).
10. James Tyson, Argentina Has 'Good Discussions' on IMF Aid Package,
BLOOMBERG NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 10, 2002 ("Argentina... needs to secure political
support for budget cuts and other conditions for new aid, according to the IMF. Ar-
gentina can't count on greater government revenue to bankroll its debt payments
because its economy in 2002 will shrink 20 percent, according to IMF estimates.
Unemployment stands at a record 22 percent, and half the population lives in pov-
erty."); see also IMF Says New Argentina Program Still Needs a "Lot of Work,"
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 24, 2002, available at 2002 WL 23633256 (quoting
IMF spokesman Tom Dawson that any new development plan would have to be sus-
tainable).
11. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 4-7 (2000).
12. Id. at 35; see also Dania Saadi, Property Laws 'Key to Development,' DAILY
STAR ONLINE, May 5, 2001, at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/business/2305 02_b.htm
(noting that the informal sector is the size of the world's twenty largest stock ex-
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nations do not have a property law system that adequately
represents that wealth in a national or global marketplace.1
Moreover, governments of developing and formerly communist
nations usually have strictly regulated economies that keep
many entrepreneurs operating in an informal economy that is
outside of a national legal system.14 According to De Soto, one
important step toward reform is the reduction of legal barriers
that keep entrepreneurs "extralegal," or outside of a country's
formal economic system. 5
This Note explores the relationship between the IMF and
Argentina and suggests that the IMF should put into practice
De Soto's theory in order to create sustainable development in
Argentina and other emerging market countries throughout the
world. Part I examines the role of the IMF in providing assis-
tance to nation-states and considers the restraints that state
sovereignty concerns place on IMF policymaking. Part II pre-
sents De Soto's theory that the economic troubles of developing
countries result from the fact that wealth in those countries ex-
ist in the informal sector separate from the legal protections of-
fered by the state. Part III suggests ways that De Soto's theory
could help the IMF as it deals with countries like Argentina.
6
Finally, Part IV considers the potential effects of implementing
such policies on state sovereignty and how this might restrain
IMF reforms in the future. This Note concludes that future re-
forms should be based on De Soto's theory, but that the these
types of reforms cannot be implemented by the IMF.
I. THE IMF AND ARGENTINA
A. THE IMF's ROLE
The IMF is an international organization that makes finan-
changes).
13. DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 6-7.
14. Id. at 154-55.
15. Id.
16. This Note does not argue that Argentina is an example of a poor or develop-
ing country. In fact, Argentina consistently ranks highly in economic measurements
of quality of life. Instead, this Note uses Argentina as an example of a country that
needs economic assistance to create sustainable economic development, but that
would also benefit from De Soto's theory. See THE ECONOMIST, POCKET WORLD IN
FIGuREs 28 (2003) (ranking Argentina thirty-fourth in the world for quality of life on
the human development index).
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cial resources available to member countries with debt problems
in order to prevent those nations from implementing economic
policies that could be destructive to long-term national or inter-
national prosperity.17 The IMF's purposes include promoting the
expansion of balanced international trade and assisting in the
establishment of loan payments between member nation-
states."
The IMF is funded by quota subscriptions, which are paid
by member countries. 9 The amount of the quota determines a
country's voting power on the IMF board of directors.20  The
United States, for example, has a high quota subscription and
therefore significant voting power on the board.2' A member
country can turn to the IMF for official borrowing to make ex-
ternal loan payments to any international lender.22 Lending
countries benefit from the IMF's work when borrowers develop
sustainable economies and are less likely to default on loans or
resort to measures that might damage long-term prosperity.2'
17. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. 1(i)-(iii),
July 22, 1944 (amended Apr. 1, 1978), 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa0l.htm [hereinafter IMF Articles of
Agreement].
18. See id.
19. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, WHAT IS THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND?
(2002), at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ftlexrplwhat.htm [hereinafter WHAT IS
THE IMF?] ("The IMF's resources come mainly from the quota (or capital) subscrip-
tions that countries pay when they join the IMF, or following periodic reviews in
which quotas are increased.").
20. See id. ("Quotas determine not only a country's subscription payments, but
also its voting power, the amount of financing it can receive from the IMF, and its
share in SDR allocations."). Quotas are also intended to reflect the country's size in
the world economy. See id.
21. JOINT ECON. COMM., SEPT. 9, 1999 JEC STATEMENTS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ADVISORY COMMISSION 5 (1999) (Statement
of Christopher Frenze) ("The official line is that the U.S. provides 18 percent of the
quotas, but the U.S. share of usable contribution is actually 26 percent. This rela-
tively large U.S. position is reflected in the strong influence of the U.S. Treasury in
IMF decision making."); see also JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 205 (4th ed. 2002) (showing the relative vot-
ing power of IMF members).
22. See WHAT IS THE IMF?, supra note 19 (noting that this is true if a country
needs official borrowing to be able to make external payments and maintain an ap-
propriate level of reserves without taking "measures destructive of national or in-
ternational prosperity").
23. Naomi Klein, 'IMF Go to Hell'. The People of Argentina Have Tried the IMF
Approach; Now They Want It Their Way, TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL, Mar. 16, 2002,
at A19; see also Maisa Mendonca, A Question of Sovereignty: Brazilian Governors
Fight Back Against the IMF, GLOBAL EXCHANGE CAMPAIGNS (Mar. 25, 1999), at
http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/brazi]economy/sovereignty.html.
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Along with the World Bank, the IMF was created to allevi-
ate worldwide poverty and create stable economies. 24 The IMF's
role has traditionally been to help states develop sensible mac-
roeconomic policies and enact structural reforms;2 while the
World Bank has focused on loans and programs that seek to en-
courage poverty reduction measures, mostly through social ser-
vices.26 In recent years, the two organizations have committed
to working more closely together to achieve common goals.27
This commitment comes after research showing that poverty re-
duction programs are only effective when they bring about re-
forms that create economic growth.28 However, such reforms re-
quire that the borrowing countries commit themselves to
policies that will lead to sustainable economic growth.29
As a result, the IMF seeks to do more than just recommend
sound macroeconomic policies; it also concerns itself with aid to
organizations and a borrowing country's willingness to reform.
In lending money, the IMF supports reforms that will correct
underlying problems with domestic economic policies." As such,
loans to borrowing countries are made contingent upon agree-
ment to a plan for moving toward a sustainable economic sys-
24. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 200-01 (quoting Gerald M. Meier, The
Bretton Woods Agreement- 25 Years After, 39 STAN. L. REV. 235, 237, 245-46 (1971)
("In combination, the Fund, the Bank, and GATT were designed to help the ad-
vanced industrial countries achieve the multiple objectives of full employment, freer
and expanding trade and stable exchange rates.")).
25. Development Finance - Old Battle, New Strategy, ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2000,
available at http://wblnO018.worldbank.orgessd/essd.nsf/d3f59aa3a57Of7a852567
cf00695688/801016e9cd807ccc8525689b0053fb47?OpenDocument (last visited Mar.
8, 2003) ("The traditional - and correct - assumption underlying 'adjustment' pro-
grammes was that faster economic growth is the best way to reduce poverty. So
IMF lending concentrated on pushing sensible macroeconomic and structural re-
forms (such as tight fiscal and monetary policies, trade liberalisation, deregulation
and privatisation). There was little analysis of the effect of these reforms on pov-
erty...").
26. See id. ("[There was] little analysis of what overall impact the World Bank's
portfolio of loans - that might cover areas ranging from banking to the environment
- would actually have on a borrowing country's poor people.").
27. Id. See generally INT'L MONETARY FUND & THE WORLD BANK,
STRENGTHENING IMF WORLD BANK COLLABORATION ON COUNTRY PROGRAMS AND
CONDITIONALITY (2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001
/eng/collab/coll.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2003).
28. Development Finance - Old Battle, New Strategy, supra note 25 ("Recent
research on the history of foreign aid by David Dollar, an economist at the World
Bank, offers two simple lessons: aid works when a country follows sensible economic
policies; but the aid itself does little actually to influence policies. It will work only if
countries are truly committed to economic reform.").
29. Id.
30. WHAT IS THE IMF?, supra note 19.
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tem. Thus, the IMF has an interest in the soundness of a
member country's government structure and in its domestic
policies. 2
B. CONCERNS ABOUT IMF INFRINGEMENT ON NATION-STATE
SOVEREIGNTY
While the notion of state sovereignty is difficult to define,
Louis Henkin suggests that it means that no state should be
subject to any external decision-making power unless it has
"voluntarily consented to such authority."33 Henkin argues fur-
ther that only states can make laws for themselves.34 Therefore,
the idea of state sovereignty includes, at least partially, the idea
that a state has a right to self-determination.3'
Critics argue that the IMF intrudes on state sovereignty,
specifically the ability of states to set their own domestic pol-
icy. 6 Especially in developing countries, the IMF is seen as a
threat to a state's self-determination through democratic proc-
esses.37 In the recent debate over the IMF's role in Argentina,
concerns over state sovereignty come from two different points
of view, each concluding that the IMF should give borrowing
governments greater decision-making authority. s
31. Id. ("IMF lending is conditional on policies: the borrowing country must
adopt policies that promise to correct its balance of payments problem.").
32. INT'L MONETARY FUND, 1998 IMF SURVEY SUPPLEMENT ON THE FUND:
CONDITIONALITY (1998), at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/sup0998/07
.htm.
33. Anthony Galano III, Comment, International Monetary Fund Response to
the Brazilian Debt Crisis: Whether the Effects of Conditionality Have Undermined
Brazil's National Sovereignty?, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 323, 342 (1994) (quoting Louis
Henkin in LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 15-16
(3d ed. 1993)).
34. Id. at 342-43.
35. See id. at 343 (questioning if the IMF has violated Brazil's sovereignty
through conditionality requirements on monetary aid).
36. L. Jacobo Rodriquez, Argentina's Addition to IMF Money, CATO DAILY
BRIEFING, Jan. 27, 2001, available at http://www.cato.org/dailys/01-27-O1.html.
37. Some authors have suggested that intrusions on state sovereignty should
be limited for countries dealing with the effects of globalization. They suggest that
countries are best able to work with organizations like the IMF when conditionality
restrictions on funding are used sparingly. See, e.g., Herbert V. Morais, The Quest
for International Standards: Global Governance v. Sovereignty, 50 KAN. L. REV. 779,
815-16 (2002) ("[T]he conditionality approach should be used sparingly and with
careful consideration only in exceptional situations.").
38. Mendonca, supra note 23 ("And once again the question that must be asked
is whether the IMF-unaccountable, undemocratic and frighteningly opaque as it
is-should be permitted to boss around democratically elected officials and in the
process harm the citizens those politicians are supposed to serve."). In addition to
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The first criticism posits that complying with IMF policy
forces a nation-state to reduce government services and accept
whatever negative consequences occur as a result. 39 To create
economic stability, the IMF often requires borrowing countries
to reduce government spending.40 For countries that are accus-
tomed to operating as a sizable welfare state, this can result in a
drastic reduction in the amount and quality of social services.4 1
This has led some commentators to argue that the IMF has re-
stricted the government's role to serve its constituents, who
have no recourse through the democratic process.42 These critics
conclude that the IMF should fund countries, but not require
strict reforms, especially reforms that reduce social spending.43
The IMF is unlikely to adopt this suggestion because of its
commitment to maintaining the conditionality of its aid as part
of its mission.44 The IMF's Articles of Agreement define the or-
ganization's role as an agent for structural reform in member
nations.45 This duty arguably includes working with member
simply being bad policy, there is an issue whether the IMF violates international
law by infringing on a state's sovereignty. The IMF, however, has never been found
in violation and the arguments against it do not seem to have much support. See
Galano, supra note 33, at 349.
39. See Eduardo Galeano, The Spectators Take the Field, THE PROGRESSIVE,
Feb. 2002, at 12-13.
40. See, e.g., David Plumb, IMF Demands Argentina Cut Spending to Get
Loans, Clarin Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 13, 2002, available at LEXIS,
News & Business, News, By Individual Publication, B, Bloomberg - All Bloomberg
News ("The International Monetary Fund demanded Argentina cut planned spend-
ing next year as the latest condition of aid that the recession-choked country has
sought for the past nine months, Clarin reported, citing unidentified Economy Min-
istry Officials.").
41. See Klein, supra note 23 ("[11n a country where half the population now
lives below the poverty line, it's hard to find a single sector of society whose fate does
not somehow hinge on the decisions made by the international lender.").
42. See id. Klein argues that the people of Latin America in general and Ar-
gentina in particular are tired of the IMF's requirements that welfare and health-
care services be reduced. Id. With no political control over the IMF, the people have
taken to the streets in protest of the Fund's policies. Id.
43. See id.
44. INT'L MONETARY FUND, MANAGING DIRECTOR'S REPORT TO THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE - STREAMLINING
CONDITIONALITY AND ENHANCING OWNERSHIP (2001), available at http://www.imf.
org/external/np/omd/2001/110601.htm [hereinafter DIRECTOR'S REPORT] ("In stream-
lining and refocusing conditionality, a key principle is that policy measures that are
critical for a program to achieve its macroeconomic objectives should continue to be
covered under conditionality; however, conditionality should be applied more spar-
ingly to structural measures that are relevant but not critical, particularly when
they are not clearly within the Fund's core areas of responsibility and expertise.").
45. See IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 1(v).
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countries to make changes that will result in long-term fiscal
stability.
4 6
Critics also note that IMF policy damages government ac-
countability. It begins with the idea that the IMF can support a
country financially, but cannot implement the domestic policy
decisions necessary for reforms. 47  The accountability of a na-
tion-state's government is muddled when the IMF mandates
economic solutions that do not work as planned. 8 This is par-
ticularly the case when local politicians are required to enact po-
litically unpopular policies. Politicians, rightly or wrongly,
blame the IMF for any problems resulting from mandated ac-
tions. 9
Alternatively, member-country politicians could refuse to
implement IMF mandates. 0 In this case, the IMF has two
choices: cut off aid or accommodate the member country's
agenda for reform.5' The IMF has been criticized for too often
choosing the latter. 2 Critics argue that necessary reforms re-
quire painful choices for member countries and that if the IMF
continually props up a country, it has no incentive to make
these choices. 3 With no change in destructive economic policies,
the countries continue to need IMF aid. 4 The situation becomes
a vicious cycle where the IMF makes decisions for a country but
will not insist on the needed reforms." This distorts the state's
ability to govern itself. These critics conclude that the IMF
should end monetary aid to countries in noncompliance and let
46. See DIRECTOR'S REPORT, supra note 44.
47. STEVE H. HANKE & KURT SCHULER, CATO INST., A MANIFESTO FOR
ECONOMIC REFORM IN ARGENTINA (2002), at http://www.cato.org/current/argentina
/pubs/hanke-020611.html; see also Rodriquez, supra note 36.
48. See Robert 0. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability,
in DAVID HELD & MATHIAS KOENIG-ARCHIBUGI, MILIBAND LECTURES (Spring 2002)
(manuscript at 18-19), available at www.poli.duke.edu/people/Faculty/docs
/millpaper.pdf ("Traditional international organizations are internally accountable
to states on the basis of authorization and support... Externally, there are signifi-
cant accountability gaps. Indeed, many poor people affected by the policies of the
IMF, World Bank and the WTO have no direct ability to hold these organizations
accountable.").
49. Argentine politicians now blame the IMF for its economic turmoil. See
Joachim Bamrud, Cry, Argentina, Cry, LATIN Bus. CHRON., Jan. 7, 2002, available
at http://-wv.latinbusinesschronicle.com/reports/commentary/argentina.htm.
50. Id.
51. HANKE & SCHULER, supra note 47.
52. Id.
53. See Rodriquez, supra note 36.
54. See id.
55. See id. (arguing that the Argentina's problems are domestic in nature, but
the IMF is not willing to require the changes).
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struggling governments manage their own economic problems.
56
The IMF is unlikely to completely accept this approach,
since part of the IMF's mission is providing members "with op-
portunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of pay-
ments without resorting to measures destructive of national or
international prosperity."57 The IMF believes that continuing to
provide this opportunity requires working with a member coun-
try to develop sound economic policies after its debt has become
unsustainable. 8 Although this response does not address the
accountability problems, it does provide a compelling reason for
the IMF to stay involved.
In spite of these criticisms, the IMF believes it can continue
to place conditions on the receipt of aid while respecting state
sovereignty. The IMF allows borrowing countries to determine
their own policies for meeting some IMF standards, while others
require very specific changes.59 However, the IMF ignores sov-
ereignty issues at its own peril.6" As some commentators sug-
gest, some IMF intrusion is inevitable, but too much infringe-
ment may make cooperative reform with national governments
impossible.6' Consequently, the IMF finds itself in a balancing
act between enforcing its standards and leaving most of the de-
cision-making to the countries themselves.62
C. THE CASE OF ARGENTINA
1. Argentina's Debt Problems
Argentina's chronic debt problems and recent economic
turmoil make it one of the most visible countries with IMF prob-
lems. As in many borrowing countries, Argentine politicians are
often irate over IMF mandates.63 Domestic political and policy
56. See id.
57. IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 1(v).
58. Anne Krueger, The Evolution of Emerging Market Capital Flows: Why We
Need to Look Again at Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Speech at the International
Monetary Fund Economics Society Dinner (Jan. 21, 2002), available at http:l
www.imf.org/externallnp/speeches/2002/012102.htm.
59. See WHAT IS THE IMF?, supra note 19.
60. See Galano, supra note 33, at 346.
61. Id. at 348-49.
62. Id. at 349.
63. See Martin Gambarotta, It's a (Grumble) Deal, BUENOS AIRES HERALD,
available at http://www.buenosairesherald.com/columnistjnote.jsp?idContent=3687
(last visited Mar. 11, 2003).
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concerns often pressure the government to implement decisions
64that are not, in the IMF's view, part of a sustainable economy.
The result is a continuous struggle between Argentina and the
IMF over loan conditions.
Over the last fifteen years, Argentina's economy has experi-
enced drastic changes, moving rapidly from economic instability
to growth and just as quickly back to instability.65 In the late
1980s and early 1990s, Argentina was plagued by hyperinfla-
tion.66 By 1998, however, its political and economic policies were
heralded as a model for emerging-market nations around the
world.67 But Argentina's rise only preceded a tumultuous fall
that culminated in political instability and economic disaster in
2001.6
There are divergent views over which international and
domestic policies led Argentina to this point. Some observers
blame mandates from the IMF for forcing Argentina to adjust
its domestic policies beyond what the country's economy could
bear.69 Most of those involved in the IMF's dealings with Argen-
tina, however, place blame on the Argentine government for
making poor economic choices. 70 This criticism is not a new one
for the Argentine government, which has a history of deficit
spending." The government has historically dealt with its defi-
cit problems through borrowing or printing currency rather than
reducing government spending.72 These policies led Argentina
down a path of hyperinflation and large international debts.73
Even during Argentina's exceptional economic development of
the 1990s, the country never reduced its deficit spending.74
64. See Anne Krueger, Transcript of an IMF Briefing on Latin America, (Sept.
23, 2002), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2002/tr020923.htm (last accessed
Jan. 17, 2003).
65. MUSSA, supra note 1, at 1-2.
66. Id. at 1.
67. Id. at 1-2.
68. Id. at 2.
69. Doubts Inside the Barricades, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 2002, at 64 ("[Tlhe
Fund pushed countries into opening up their economies to foreign capital prema-
turely, and that this openness lies at the heart of the current turmoil.").
70. Id. ("One line of argument blames the current turmoil on Latin America's
failure to adopt the Washington Consensus with sufficient rigor.").
71. One commentator likened Argentina's spending patterns to "a chronic alco-
holic-once it starts to imbibe the political pleasures of deficit spending, it keeps on
going until i[t] reaches the economic equivalent of falling down drunk." MUSSA, su-
pra note 1, at 10.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 15-16 ("In sum, during the period from 1993-98 when the Argentine
[Vol. 12:2
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The disastrous economic situation can be attributed, at
least in part, to Argentina's political situation. After President
Menem was term-limited in 1999, lower tax revenues and in-
creased social spending made it difficult for any candidate in the
1999 election to make debt reduction a priority. 5 Moreover,
much of the government's spending is attributable to the coun-
try's provinces, which retain the authority to increase social
spending that is then transferred to federal debt.7" With the
economy struggling, President de la Rua, along with a majority
of Argentine politicians, rejected a plan for fiscal consolidation
and sharp reductions in government spending.
7
Argentina also suffers from corruption within its govern-
ment's institutions. The Global Competitiveness Report ranked
Argentina near the bottom of the world for business conditions,
independence of judiciary, reliability of police protection, and
corruption in the legal system.78 Crime resulting from corrupt
institutions has long been a problem in Argentina, and it has re-
cently become worse.79 Violent crime has more than doubled in
Buenos Aires since 1991.80 In fact, many crimes occur with the
tacit approval of police forces.81
2. The IMF's Role in Argentina
The IMF, at the very least, was a tacit partner in Argen-
tina's collapse. 2 When the country's deficits repeatedly grew
economy was generally performing very well and the Argentine government was re-
ceiving substantial nonrecurring revenues from privatization and enjoyed other
temporary fiscal benefits, the public sector debt-to-GDP ratio nevertheless rose by
12 percentage points. This clearly was not an adequately disciplined or sustainable
fiscal policy.") (emphasis omitted); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
75. MUSSA, supra note 1, at 26 ("[E]lection year concerns further depressed the
normally low level that most Argentine politicians, at all levels of government, at-
tached to measures of fiscal prudence.").
76. Brink Lindsey, How Argentina Got Into This Mess, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9,
2002, at A14 (finding that "[o]perating expenses at the provincial level rose 25%
from 1995 to 2000 even though inflation was nonexistent. The spending binge was
financed by an unsustainable run up of external debt-the reckoning for which has
now arrived.").
77. MUSSA, supra note 1, at 37.
78. Lindsey, supra note 76.
79. Delinquent, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 2002, at 34.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Editorial, Who Lost Argentina?, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan. 5, 2002, at
A20.
Much of this debate follows well-worn ideological lines. Analysts from the
2003]
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beyond its target projections, the IMF simply revised estimates
and sent more assistance. 3 Rather than force Argentina to ex-
ercise stricter fiscal control, the IMF consistently changed its
own debt predictions to accommodate Argentina's growing defi-
cit.84 For example, by the summer of 2001, it was clear that Ar-
gentina would be unable to meet the IMF's economic goals, and
there was no serious hope for economic recovery.85 Nonetheless,
the IMF approved a large augmentation package as a last
chance initiative.86 This disbursement of additional funds de-
layed Argentina's collapse by only a few months."
Unfortunately, Argentina's problems have resulted in the
deepest recession in fifty years,' s and led to deteriorating living
conditions for Argentina's population. Seventy two percent of
Argentine children live in poverty, on less than fifty dollars a
month.89 During 2002, unemployment in the greater Buenos Ai-
res region was estimated as high as twenty-six percent, which is
five times what is was ten years ago.90
3. The Future of Argentina's Relationship With the IMF
Now well into its worst recession since the 1930s,91 Argen-
tina continues to seek financial help. In January 2003, the IMF
and Argentina agreed to a stand-by credit arrangement that will
allow the nation to make debt payments to the IMF through
left say the IMF and the U.S. Treasury Department wrecked Argentina's
economy with conservative, free-market policies. Analysts on the right
blame irresponsible deficit spending by governments in Buenos Aires. In
fact, both sides are right. And there are plenty of lessons that the United
States should learn.
Id.
83. MUSSA, supra note 1, at 18-19. Mussa argues that revising estimates was
sometimes the correct approach. Not requiring Argentina to come in below its debt
reduction targets when its economy was strong was the IMF's mistake. Id.
84. Id. at 19.
85. Id. at 45.
86. The bailout plan was approved in the summer of 2001, and disbursed in
September. See id. at 43-44, 47 (The plan included "$6 billion [in aid] ... with a
pledge of $3 billion more to support an unspecified debt restructuring-was extraor-
dinary both in its size and in the lack of any reasonable justification.").
87. Id. at 47-48.
88. Helen Murphy, Argentina Survey Finds 4.5 MLN Children in Poverty,
Clarin Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 3, 2002, available at LEXIS, News &
Business, News, By Individual Publication, B, Bloomberg - All Bloomberg News.
89. Id.
90. See Ismael Bermdidez, Conurbano: el Desempleo Mds Alto, CLARIN, Aug. 23,
2002, available at http://old.clarin.com/diario/2002/08/23/e-01901.htm.
91. Doubts Inside the Barricades, supra note 69.
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August 2003.92 The agreement also grants Argentina an exten-
sion in paying additional loans that were initially due in 2003.
93
The stand-by credit arrangement is intended as a transitional
measure, leading Argentina to another long-term agreement
that will include comprehensive economic reforms.94 Explaining
that the new arrangements were approved as the beginning of
long-term reforms in Argentina, IMF Managing Director Horst
Kohler stated that the IMF intended to preserve macroeconomic
stability and a social safety net during Argentina's current cri-
sis." After Argentina's 2003 elections, however, the country is
expected to enact ambitious reforms, in part, focusing on areas
of fiscal discipline, legal reforms, and tax reform.96
Meanwhile, the IMF continues to struggle with a plan to
help countries like Argentina balance their debt payments and
create sustainable economic growth.97 The IMF's proposed plan
treats defaulting countries like bankrupt corporations, thereby
reducing the need to completely cut off aid or continue with un-
warranted lending.99 The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mecha-
nism (SDRM) would restructure a country's debt in order to re-
sume regular loan payments.99 The IMF argues that this system
will be a valuable tool in moving towards reform.00 Its goal is to
"allow countries with clearly unsustainable burdens to restruc-
ture their debts in a fashion that preserves economic activity
and asset values, while protecting creditors' rights."01 Toward
this end, SDRM creates a legal basis within which debtor coun-
92. Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Approves Transitional Stand-By






97. Bankruptcies or Bailouts, BUS. LINE, June 7, 2002, available at LEXIS,
News & Business, News, News Group File, All.
98. Id. (The IMF is working on sovereign debt restructuring under the ration-
ale that "private corporations get protection under bankruptcy laws, why not have
similar arrangements to shield states facing bankruptcy?").
99. Krueger, supra note 64.
100. Horst Kohler, Promoting Sustained Growth and International Financial
Stability, Address Before the National Press Club (Apr. 17, 2002), at
http://www.imf.orglexternal/np/speeches/2002/041702.htm.
101. Anne 0. Krueger, Crisis Prevention and Resolution: The Role of Sovereign
Debt Restructuring, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute Symposium in
Washington D.C. (Oct. 7, 2002), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002
/100702a.htm.
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tries can work to restructure debt payments.0 2 But even with
the new debt restructuring plans, a country must have sound
structural institutions in order to maintain sustainable eco-
nomic development. 103 Keeping this goal in mind, the IMF hopes
to enact reforms with its upcoming comprehensive agreement
with Argentina. 1
0 4
II. THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL
Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto offers one possible
solution to problems in countries like Argentina. De Soto ar-
gues that the problem in developing countries is not that they
lack wealth, but that they lack the institutional framework to
recognize and trade capital.'00 De Soto calls wealth in these
countries "dead capital," meaning that it is not recognized by a
formal legal system and can only be traded or sold within a nar-
row community. 0 6 These informal, or extralegal, sectors com-
prise much of the wealth in the developing world. 107 This sector
consists of legitimate commercial activity that operates outside
of established judicial, regulatory, and institutional frame-
works.08 This activity is only illegal because the barriers for
joining or operating in the formal economy are too cumbersome
or expensive for most individuals to comply. 10
De Soto argues that wealthy countries and strong econo-
mies depend on legal structures that convert general wealth into
102. Id.
103. See NEVIN SHAW, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, THE FUTURE ROLE OF BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS IN PROMOTING
GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, at http://www.iisd.org/trade/bretton.htm#why
slow (last visited Mar. 4, 2003).
104. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
105. DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 6-7.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 35 ("By our calculations, the total value of the real estate held but not
legally owned by the poor of the Third World and former communist nations is at
least $9.3 trillion.").
108. CATHERINE KUCHTA-HELBLING, CENTER FOR INT'L PRIVATE ENTERPRISE,
BACKGROUND PAPER: BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION: THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES 4 (2000), available at http://www.cipe.org/pdf
/informalsector/informalEnglish.pdf; see also THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: STUDIES IN
ADVANCED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (Alejandro Portes et al. eds., 1989);
Edgar L. Feige, Defining and Estimating Underground and Informal Economies:
The New Institutional Economics Approach, 18 WORLD DEV. 989 (1990); Jaime
Saavedra & Alberto Chong, Structural Reform, Institutions and Earnings: Evidence
from the Formal and Informal Sectors in Urban Peru, 35 J. DEV. ST. 95 (1999).
109. KUCHTA-HELBLING, supra note 108, at 4.
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capital."1 In essence, this means that the government provides
and enforces titles or other proofs of ownership that are univer-
sally transferable."1 Such systems are so established that they
become inherent in the daily economic lives of people in devel-
oped countries, especially in western countries. 12
There are two primary barriers to converting wealth into
capital. The first is government bureaucracy."13 The longer it
takes to create a business, acquire a title, or receive a permit,
the less likely it is that individuals will enter the formal econ-
omy.114 Instead, entrepreneurs will operate informally through
illegal titles and land ownership."" De Soto documents this phe-
nomenon through studies of countries like Mexico, where it
takes an average of two years of full-time work to create a new
business. 116 Moreover, once the business is created, most entre-
preneurs cannot afford the costs associated with following the
regulations and acquiring permits."7 Economic activity becomes
and remains informal because of the cost of legality.118 As a re-
sult, Mexico's informal economy is estimated between twenty-
eight and thirty-nine percent of the country's GDP." 9
The second barrier to converting wealth into capital is a
disconnect between the existence of formal property rights sys-
120 fcotems and public benefit from those systems. One factor con-
tributing to this barrier is the fact that formal law has often
been created by and for a country's upper class.'2' There is little
consideration of how it might better reflect the economic reali-
ties of the general public. 2 2 Another problem is that those who
do not formally hold wealth rarely hold political power. 123 As a
result, "poorly designed institutions bar entrepreneurs from or
discourage their participation in the political and economic sys-
110. DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 11.
111. Id. at 6.
112. KUCHTA-HELBLING, supra note 108, at 1-3.
113. Id. at 4.
114. See DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 18-21.
115. Id.
116. Hernando de Soto, Latin America's Future in an Interdependent World,
Remarks at the Milken Institute 2002 Global Conference Panel Discussion (Apr. 23,
2002), at http://www.milkeninstitute.org/gc2002/prog-detail.cfm?ID=39.
117. KUCHTA-HELBLING, supra note 108, at 2.
118. Enrique Ghersi, The Informal Economy in Latin America, 17 CATO J. 99
(1997), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cjl7nl-8.html.
119. DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 135.
120. Id. at 154-55.
121. KUCHTA-HELBLING, supra note 108, at 2.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 3.
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tern."'24 This creates a cycle where entrepreneurs cannot gain
access to the formal sector because of onerous regulations and
cannot change the regulations because they do not have the type
of capital that brings influence in the political system.
De Soto uses his explanation of the informal sector to con-
clude that reforms in a changing economy must not forget the
"origins of capital":
After the fall of communism, the rest of the world turned to the West
for help and was advised to imitate its conditions: stable currencies,
open markets, and private business, the objectives of so-called macro-
economic and structural adjustment reforms. Everyone forgot the
foundation on which these conditions could grow.
This is one principle reason macroeconomic reforms are not working.
Imitating capitalism.. .by importing McDonald's and Blockbuster fran-
chises, is not enough to create wealth. What is needed is capital, and
this requires a complex and mighty system of legal property that we
have all taken for granted.
126
De Soto recommends focusing reforms on structural eco-
nomic and governmental systems that trap wealth in a country's
informal economy. 127 By concentrating on this "capitalization"
process, more people can operate in the global economy. 128 Once
property ownership is recognized economic actors can operate on
a much broader scale. 12' For example, consider a house or piece
of real estate. If an owner has no legal system for recognizing
that he or she owns the home, it can only be dealt with inside of
a small community of those willing to recognize the ownership.
However, if that ownership is represented by a title that is uni-
versally accepted, the owner will be able to trade the property
on a national or global scale.'2 '
When it comes to reform, De Soto criticizes policymakers for
assuming that adjustments on a macro level are sufficient for
sustainable economic growth.' When policymakers at any level
seek only to open markets to foreign investment and place or-
thodox economists in charge of treasury departments, they for-
get about a formal system of property recognition that makes
124. Id.
125. See id. at 9-17 (describing in-depth the economic and political implications
of the informal sector).
126. DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 66.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 67.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 47.
131. Id. at 211.
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investment and sustainable development possible.'32 Problems
in reforming developing countries result because "[e]conomic re-
formers have left the issue of property for the poor in the hands
of conservative legal establishments uninterested in changing
the status quo." "' The result, despite reforms, is a large infor-
mal economy and the problems that come along with it.'
Argentina's reformers are now presented with the challenge
of addressing the country's fundamental problems. They must
decide whether to default on loan payments, whether to restruc-
ture Argentina's debt, and how to deal with the need for addi-
tional domestic spending. The government's choices will deter-
mine its future relationship with the IMF and the rest of the
world. International reformers at the IMF must also decide
what policies Argentina must implement before reform can be-
gin. So far, the IMF's attempts to help solve Argentina's prob-
lems have focused on refinancing debt to create a stable system
of payments. 3' As the next section argues, more of Argentina's
informal economy must be drawn into the formal sector if the
country is to truly address its structural problems.
III. THE IMF AND ARGENTINA'S INFORMAL ECONOMY: A
NEW APPROACH TO REFORM
While Argentina has cycled through numerous reforms, it
has failed to effectively address some of the fundamental prob-
lems posed by a sizable informal economy. These problems in-
clude public debt and corrupt government institutions.' 36 Not
addressing these problems results in difficulty in creating sus-
tainable economic development,'37 one goal of the IMF's work.3 8
De Soto criticizes the failure of policymakers who, like the IMF,
attempt to implement reform without addressing the problem of
informal capital.39  De Soto's argument shows that future eco-
nomic reforms in Argentina must include a formalization proc-
132. DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 211-12 ("Because [contemporary policymakers]
concentrated only on policies dealing with the aggregates, they did not inquire
whether people had the means to participate in expanded market systems.").
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 70-73, 78-80 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 70-74 and 78-81 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 126-27, 131 and accompanying text.
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ess that brings hidden capital into the formal economy.4 ° Both
Argentina's government structure and critics' valid concerns
over state sovereignty limit the IMF's ability to require formal-
ization, however.' The inability of the IMF to implement the
necessary policies for reform casts doubt on the likelihood of fu-
ture IMF success in Argentina."'
A. ARGENTINA'S INFORMAL SECTOR
Argentina's economic instability comes partially from barri-
ers that keep capital in the informal sector and partially from
not having the political will to reform.' These two characteris-
tics indicate that citizens who operate extralegally do not have a
voice in current government reform efforts. 44 To engage these
citizens, Argentina should first deal with the institutional cor-
ruption that keeps the entrepreneurial class operating in the in-
formal sector.' 4 ' This will increase the ability of Argentine citi-
zens to operate in a national and global marketplace, as well as
provide the smoothest transition toward the broader reforms
that the IMF requests.4
Future reforms should require the reduction of barriers that
keep hidden capital outside of the formal marketplace. 4 7 When
it comes to drawing capital into the formal marketplace, Argen-
tina has done a better job than many other Latin American• 148
countries. Yet, the fact that one third of Argentine capital
remains in the informal sector reflects barriers that prevent
capital from coming into the legal system.149 Argentina's infor-
140. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
141. See infra Part IV.B.
142. See supra notes 126-27, 131 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 240-46
and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 123-25, 126-27 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
147. De Soto has contrasted this simple paradigm for reform to the "Olympian"
view used by international policymakers. See DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 211.
148. It is estimated that six out of every ten jobs in Latin America were created
in the informal sector during the 1990s. See INT'L LABOR ORG., SKILLS
DEVELOPMENT FOR THE INFORMAL ECONOMY, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
employment/skills/informal/who.htm (last modified Nov. 16, 2000). In Argentina,
the figure is between three and four out often. Id.
149. See DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 28, 76, 252. De Soto writes that "if capital-
ism is the body, then a legal property system is the brain." Id. It is the institutional
barriers to the legal property system that prevent the entrance of extralegal capital.
Id. at 62.
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mal economy also results in weakened public institutions.5 °
This weakness contributes to economic barriers that keep en-
trepreneurs out of the formal economy and is one of the factors
that played a part in Argentina's economic collapse.'51 There-
fore, finding a way to remove these barriers to the formal mar-
ketplace should be the center of additional reform.
The growth of Argentina's informal sector can be directly
tied to increasingly burdensome economic regulations 152 and
higher government expenditures.153  The nationalized market-
place results in restrictions on labor markets, trade, and finan-
cial activity.54  An Argentine entrepreneur needs forty-eight
days and must go through fourteen different procedural steps to
start a new business.' With limited prospects in the over-
regulated formal economy, Argentina's economic agents opt into
the extralegal sector. 56 The size of Argentina's informal sector
alone indicates how the country could benefit from integrating
its hidden capital. 5 7 Tellingly, when informal sector data is in-
cluded in economic models, the size and annual growth rate of
Argentina's economy increase dramatically. 15 One can conclude
that the country's problems lie not in the fact that it is poor, but
150. De Soto discusses several ways that poorly structured government institu-
tions can result in a greater informal sector and a slower economy. See id. at 154-
55.
151. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
152. See John Zemko, Politicas para Reducir el Sector Informal y Promover la
Inversion, CTR. FOR INT'L PRIVATE ENTER., at 4, at http://www.cipe.org/
pdf/publications/fs/miami.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
153. Adrian Guissari, Driven to Informality, INFORMAL SECTOR NEWSL. (Ctr. for
Int'l Private Enter., Washington, D.C.), 1991, available at http://www.cipe
.org/publications/fs/ertleO2/5argent.htm ("A rigorous review of six decades of Argen-
tine economic performance-and the changes in the state's role during those years-
reveals just how avoidable informality was. It occurred not by accident, but rather
as a logical consequence of uncontrolled public expenditures that grew ... to 51.2
percent [of the GDP] in 1985.").
154. Id.
155. See generally SIMEON DJANKOV ET AL., HARVARD INST. OF ECON. RESEARCH,
THE REGULATION OF ENTRY (2000), at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2000
papers/HIER1905.pdf.
156. Guissari, supra note 153 ("Once this economic monster was in place, its
progress was distorted by over-regulation, price controls and market restrictions.
These led, inevitably, to a skewed labor market, overblown social security system,
and protectionist restrictions on foreign trade and financial activity. Faced with
these hurdles, Argentines had one choice: stagnation or informality. They chose in-
formality, and they chose it in droves!").
157. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
158. See Guissari, supra note 153 (finding that the GDP in Argentina grew at an
annual rate of 2.63 percent between 1931 and 1985, while factoring in the estimated
size of the informal sector shows growth at 3.72 percent).
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in that Argentina does not have the institutions to recognize
that wealth as capital, which can be traded in a broader mar-
ketplace 9
Integrating hidden capital into the formal marketplace re-
quires creating a system of property recognition and reforming
corrupt and inefficient government structures. 160  Macroeco-
nomic reform in Argentina has failed because it cannot success-
fully change government structures in order to include extrale-
gal capital in the formal economy.' 61 Therefore, a more effective
IMF policy would move toward encouraging Argentina to in-
clude a formalization process in necessary legal reforms. 62
The IMF's current attempt at reform, the temporary
agreement with Argentina and the SDRM plan, do not go far
enough in addressing the basic barriers to reform.' The cur-
rent transitional plan bails out Argentina without requiring
specific reforms.6 6 The IMF claims that Argentina has agreed
to enact reforms in the future, but such measures would surely
result in short-term pain for the Argentine people.6 5 While the
IMF sounds optimistic about enacting future reforms in Argen-
tina, it is not clear that doing so is politically feasible for the Ar-
gentine government.
166
The IMF's SDRM program attempts to find a balance be-
tween ending aid completely and continuing lending without re-
quiring reforms. 67  Former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill
characterized the balance as either "unwarranted lending or
sending the troubled nation off a cliff and into a catastrophic de-
fault."6 s This illustrates the IMF's predicament when working
with a country that has fallen into economic catastrophe: it
needs to hold the country accountable for failed reforms, but
159. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
160. See DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 20-22 (describing government barriers to
the formal economy in Peru and the Philippines).
161. See id. at 66, 211-12 (noting that macroeconomic reform policies cannot ad-
dress the fundamental problems in a nation's economy).
162. See id.
163. See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
165. See Klein, supra note 23 (explaining the possible impact of reforms in
graphic detail).
166. For example, the political pressure not to reduce government spending, one
of the IMF's stated goals, has historically been very difficult for Argentine to with-
stand. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
167. Krueger, supra note 58.
168. See Doubts Inside the Barricades, supra note 69.
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also work with the country to bring about economic stability. 169
However, addressing only this balance ignores other im-
pediments to reform. If a country has fundamental flaws in its
government institutions, then no loan repayment plan will lead
to long-term sustainability."7 ° Instead of continuing to support a
government structure that is not going to work, the IMF must
advocate structural reforms that recognize property ownership,
create more accountable and transparent public institutions,
and reduce bureaucratic barriers to entrepreneurs. 171 Future re-
forms should include steps ensuring that every land owner has a
title to his or her property and is able to trade and borrow with
that title;7 2 making it easier to start a business by reducing
regulations on new entrepreneurs; 73 and beginning a process of
reform to end corruption in government legal institutions.
174
Imposing such fundamental reforms on Argentina would be
an unprecedented step into the country's domestic policies. Yet,
the IMF already requires Argentina to either agree with its poli-
cies, regardless of the domestic effects, or forego IMF assis-
tance. 175 In the past, Argentina has complied with, and even ex-
ceeded, the IMF's requirements for free market reform.
President Menem's reform agenda throughout the 1990s fol-
lowed the IMF's policy recommendations for sustainable eco-
nomic growth.177 Menem believed that his government "defini-
tively eradicated" government corruption, state-funded
169. Id.
170. Lindsey, supra note 76.
171. These are the essential issues of De Soto's reforms. See infra note 172.
172. Dani Saadi, Property Laws 'Key to Development' Economist Outlines Recipe
for Growth, THE DAILY STAR ONLINE, May 23, 2002, at http://www.dailystar.
com.lb/business/23_05_02_b.htm (showing how De Soto's plan increases the value of
property through the "paperization" of legal security in property); see also THE
WORLD BANK, TooLs AND PRACTICES: LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORMS 217-21, avail-
able at http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/empowerment/toolsprac/tooll4.pdf (last
visited Feb. 12, 2003) (discussing the success of property rights reforms in Peru);
Marcia Villanueava, GMA: Poor Can Be Wealth Generators, PHILIPPINE STAR, July
27, 2001, available at http://www.philstar.com/philstar/show-content.asp?article
=45085 (describing how a plan to give every land owner a title worked in the Philip-
pines).
173. De Soto, supra note 116 (arguing that excessive government bureaucracy
inhibits the growth in prosperity in the region).
174. KUCHTA-HELBLING, supra note 108, at 9-17.
175. Galano, supra note 33, at 347.
176. See Menem, supra note 3.
177. Id. ("[W~e have worked side by side with the IMF, the World Bank, and the
IDB to achieve macroeconomic stability, deepen structural reforms, and adopt poli-
cies aimed at improving the economic fortunes of the poorest members of society.").
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programs, and deficits with the IMF's encouragement. 17  Even
while the government implemented some of the IMF's policy
recommendations, however, problems like government debt, cor-
rupt institutions, and bureaucratic obstacles remained in
place.179
In its approach to Argentina's most recent problems, the
IMF is again calling for domestic policy reforms.' The IMF's
policy is to ask specifically for broader macroeconomic reforms
while leaving the specifics of structural domestic reforms for Ar-
gentina to take care of on its own.'8' Added to this is the new
SDRM plan that seeks to reform a country's economy on a broad
balance of payments level without addressing the domestic bar-
riers to sustainable economic growth."8 '
B. THE INFORMAL ECONOMY AND GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION
One benefit of the formal economy is that it provides secu-
rity in property ownership. This is a primary incentive for en-
trepreneurs to enter the formal sector because it makes it
cheaper for entrepreneurs to operate legally than to remain ex-
tralegal. 8 3 The entrepreneur nearly always wants to be able to
operate legally, and De Soto's research indicates that most en-
trepreneurs will join the formal economy if provided with legal
and structural security."" However, if structural institutions
like police forces, the judiciary, and political representatives are
unreliable, then the benefits of entering the formal economy are
lost. '85 Thus, the process of drawing hidden capital into the for-
178. Id.
179. Peter Hudson, Menem's Argentina: Economic Miracle or Quick Fix?, 22
WASH. Q. 175, 178 (1999) (finding that Argentina's public debt rose and corruption
remained a problem, albeit under the surface, during Menem's administration).
180. Plumb, supra note 40 ("The International Monetary Fund demanded Ar-
gentina cut planned spending months, Clarin reported, citing unidentified Economy
Ministry officials.").
181. Emad Mekay, Finance: New IMF Lending Terms Will Change Nothing,
Critics Say, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 25, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4915995
(finding that the IMF's "conditionalities now focus on core areas of expertise at the
fund, such as macroeconomic advice on items like exchange rates, monetary and fis-
cal policies and financial-sector and capital-market issues").
182. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
183. DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 154-55.
184. Id. at 154 (showing that the benefits of operating legitimately, which in-
clude police protection and greater opportunities to gain investments and trade on a
broader marketplace, outweigh the expense of having to pay taxes and following the
law).
185. This is because there is no benefit from joining a formal sector if an indi-
vidual cannot rely on it protecting his or her property title. Id. at 155 (showing the
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mal economy requires reliable defenses for individual property
rights. 
186
Just as corruption drives individuals into Argentina's in-
formal sector, the informal sector encourages government cor-
ruption. Barriers to the formal economy force entrepreneurs to
operate outside of its rule in the extralegal sector.'87 The prob-
lem works the other way as well. Since the extralegal actors op-
erate outside of legal rules, they also must discover a way to op-
erate outside of legal protection.' They must find a way to
work around government institutions, especially legal institu-
tions, that stand in their way. Individuals are already operating
illegally; dodging law enforcement through bribery or other ille-
gal means are necessary steps to survive.'89 Thus, the rise of in-
formality in the economy correlates with the rise of corruption
among law enforcement and in the judicial system.' 90
Corruption among Argentina's legal institutions also causes
further growth in the informal economy and extralegal activity
of all kinds. In a corrupt system, the laws themselves are ir-
relevant since enforcement is unreliable. While the protection
of assets and ability to operate on a larger scale provide incen-
tive for economic actors to join the formal economy, 19 corruption
takes these incentives away since there is no sense in joining a
legal system of rules that are routinely ignored. 9 2 Since corrup-
tion and the informal economy seem to feed off each other, ef-
forts to end the corruption of Argentine institutions and draw
institutional benefits in Peru's formal sector).
186. Id.
187. ZEMKO, supra note 152, at 4 ("But when these institutions are not well-
designed, the industrialists must face difficult and complicated regulations and
laws, and corrupt governments and few benefits if they decide to participate in the
formal economy. The bad or weak institutions increase the cost of the commercial
transactions and prevent economic growth.").
188. Id. at 7.
189. See DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 155.
190. It is probably not possible to find a direct link between the informal sector
and corruption since both have been around for a very long time. However, it is pos-
sible to say that the two contribute to each other. As this Note argues in the next
paragraph, corrupt institutions contribute to extralegal activity. See id. ("Extralegal
businesses are taxed by... continually having to hide their operations .... The only
'insurance' available to them is that provided by their neighbors and the protection
that local bullies or mafias are willing to sell them.").
191. See supra notes 127-30.
192. Simon Johnson et al., Public Finances and the Unofficial Economy, Presen-
tation Before the Economic Commission for Latin American and Chile Conference 2-
3 (Jan. 26-28, 1998), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/
wps2169.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2003).
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actors into the formal economy must be done at the same time. 193
In order to give people assurance that their capital will be pro-
tected in the formal marketplace, they must believe that the law
is reliable and enforceable.
C. THE INFORMAL SECTOR, PUBLIC DEBT, AND SUSTAINABLE
ECONOMIC GROWTH
De Soto's work in Peru shows how his theory can be imple-
mented in practice. After researching the nature of property
ownership and entrepreneurship in Peru, De Soto found that a
typical entrepreneur in Lima would have to spend six hours a
day for three hundred days to start a new business.' The cost
of doing so was thirty two times the monthly minimum wage.195
De Soto also found that sixty five percent of the population did
not have a formal property title for their home or land.' 9' Nota-
bly, the problem of hidden capital existed almost exclusively for
the poorest members of Peru's population,'9 7 who also had the
most difficult time gaining recourse from the political process.198
In 1988 and 1990, the Peruvian Congress accepted De Soto's
proposals for simplifying the process of receiving a formal prop-
erty title and starting new businesses. 9 Only a few years later,
formerly extralegal businesses paid $1.2 billion in tax reve-
200
nues.
Argentina can learn from Peru's example. The IMF's prob-
lems with Argentina are partly due to the nation's large public
deficits20 1 and political unwillingness to end deficit spending.
20 2
Integrating extralegal capital into the formal economy will help
solve this problem in a number of ways. First, businesses and
individuals that operate in the informal economy do not pay
193. Research on corruption and the informal sector has found that entrepre-
neurs who cannot afford to operate formally as a result of government regulation or
corruption often choose to opt out and operate informally. Id. at 3.
194. DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 190.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 252.
197. Id. at 190.
198. Id. at 198-206 (noting that it is principally law makers and custodians of a
country's bureaucracy that prevent reform). However, once De Soto and his group
began releasing information on the bureaucratic problems that existed, his formal-
ization policies became politically popular. See id. at 191.
199. Id. at 191.
200. DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 154.
201. Lindsey, supra note 76.
202. Rodriquez, supra note 36.
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taxes."' Peru's case shows the revenue possibilities in the in-
formal economy.2 4 Argentina's measurements of how much ex-
tralegal capital exists are unclear, but it is estimated that at
least thirty-seven percent of Argentina's GDP exists outside of
the formal economy.2 °5 Incorporating this capital would increase
tax revenue and result in economic growth in the formerly ex-
tralegal sector.200 Since formerly extralegal actors could invest
in other markets and borrow and trade with their own capital,
capital would increase in the Argentine economy.2 7 Reducing
the size of the informal sector will also bring people under the
rule of law and reduce crime and government corruption.0 8
Consequently, the government could begin to reduce its deficit,
the level of corruption, and the resulting problems that have
plagued Argentina.
This section has outlined three of Argentina's problems that
can be addressed by reducing size of the country's informal sec-
tor. Beyond these three specific areas, bringing informal capital
into the formal marketplace will make it easier for Argentine
entrepreneurs to operate legally, encourage innovation, and as-
sure the security of property ownership and private sector in-
vestment.209  Encouraging innovation and investment in Argen-
tina's private sector is the ultimate goal of efforts to offer
Argentina additional loans, require looser restrictions on banks,
and allow for freer trade.210
203. The informal sector has its own kind of taxation. The need to bribe police
and mafias is one example. DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 155.
204. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
205. Estimates of the amount of capital in the informal sector are nearly always
too low. De Soto's research underestimated the amount of informal capital in
economies in Latin America. See DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 76.
206. Id. at 154. While De Soto stresses that the poor will benefit most from for-
malizing capital, he also notes that creating an orderly market that makes property
owners accountable will generate an expanding market, encourage law and order,
and "put money into the pockets of the elite." Id. at 198.
207. Id. at 194.
208. Id. at 196 ("The right to property also engenders respect for the law.").
209. See supra notes 105-30 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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IV. OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION: CRITICISMS OF
DE SOTO AND LIMITATIONS OF THE IMF IN SHAPING
DOMESTIC POLICY
Any fundamental reform will face opposition from Argen-
tina's political factions and international critics.21' While De
Soto's theory has been generally hailed as a positive model for
developing and formerly communist nations, it is subject to at
least two general critiques. As such, while De Soto claims to
transcend typical political debate, his efforts will also undergo
scrutiny.
Also, the IMF confronts additional problems if it requires
De Soto's formalization process for Argentina's government.
While De Soto's recommendations have been implemented by
national governments,212 such policy recommendations have
never been attempted by an international organization without
the full cooperation of the national government. Moreover, state
sovereignty concerns create particular barriers for the IMF in
reforming Argentina's informal economy.213
A. CRITICISMS OF DE SOTO
One criticism targets De Soto's premise that increased in-
volvement in globalization is good for the poor in developing
countries.214 Critics might argue that if De Soto has his way,
those in the extralegal sector will not increase their wealth since
they may be pushed off the market by larger and wealthier for-
eign investors. 21' For example, imagine one of the hundreds of
fruit and vegetable retailers operating extralegally on street cor-
ners in Latin America. If their activity were suddenly on the
same playing field as larger retailers and the larger produce re-
211. See Lindsey, supra note 76.
212. See supra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
213. See infra Part W.B.
214. DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 210 (arguing that opening developing countries
is good, but that they must also include a developing country's ability to use its capi-
tal in the open market).
215. Generally, this argument holds that reducing regulations for the informal
economy would also result in easier regulations on the formal economy and multina-
tional corporations that might want to take advantage of new markets. As large in-
vestors expand into new markets, they might push out smaller, formerly extralegal
entrepreneurs. See Alicia Morris Groos, International Trade and Development: Ex-
ploring the Impact of Fair Trade Organizations in the Global Economy and the Law,
34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 379, 384 (1999) (arguing that traditional notions of "free trade"




tailers suddenly received an influx in capital, the larger produc-
ers could buy out or force out the smaller entrepreneurs. Thus,
De Soto confronts one of the constant criticisms of globalization -
it produces greater inequality by benefiting the wealthy at the
expense of the poor.2 16
De Soto, however, is aware of the dangers that arise from
inequality.217 He fears that reformers who ignore the informal
sector are blocking access to expanded markets for a majority of
people in many developing countries, and thereby setting the
stage for class confrontations. 2" But De Soto believes the class
divide is a result of the laws and bureaucracy that keep poorer
citizens in the informal economy.219 He argues that the failure of
globalization is not a market failure, but the government's fail-
ure to allow its citizens to take advantage of their existing capi-tal. 220
Formalization's benefits outweigh the costs to the poor. The
highly regulated economic systems in some countries breed
highly inefficient formal economies. 22' Nevertheless, entrepre-
neurs in the informal sector have shown their ingenuity by cre-
ating wealth without the benefits of legal protection and recog-
nition.222 Bringing these entrepreneurs into the formal economy
will increase competition and make larger businesses more effi-
cient.223 It is possible that the larger multinational corporations
will buy or force out smaller operators. But at least under De
Soto's plan, the poor can decide how to use their capital and
they would no longer be trapped in the informal sector.224 For
this reason alone, it is not convincing to argue that extralegal
entrepreneurs are somehow safe from outside encroachment in
the informal economy.
216. DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 210.
217. Id. at 210-14.
218. Id. De Soto recognizes this as the same trap that Karl Marx foresaw; there-
fore, addressing legal inequalities is "facing up to Marx's ghost." Id. ("The great con-
tradiction of the capitalist system is that it creates its own demise because it cannot
avoid concentrating capital in a few hands.").
219. Id. at 212.
220. Id. at 207.
221. See Lisa Trei, Experts Seek Out Root Causes of Latin America's Economic
Inefficiencies, STANFORD REPORT, Jan. 23, 2002, at http://www.stanford.edu/dept
/news/report/news/january23/socsciconf-123.html (quoting political science Professor
Steven Haber that political systems in Latin America have given rise to economic
rules and regulations that produce inefficient economies by design).
222. DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 35.
223. Id. at 194.
224. See supra note 172 (showing how capitalization empowers the poorest sec-
tor of Peru's economy).
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Critics may note that reducing regulations could also mean
a reduction in desirable results like benefits to employees, safety
standards, and environmental protections. Bringing businesses
into the formal economy, however, would allow the government
to more accurately understand the extent of these problems in
their society and perhaps address them within a regulatory
framework with fewer regulations.2 " For example, Argentine
businesses that operate extralegally do not contribute to a state-
mandated social security fund for employees. Reducing regu
lations to bring more people into the formal economy would re-
sult in a net gain for the number of Argentines in these types of
227programs.
B. CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMF's IMPLEMENTATION OF DE
SOTO'S REFORMS
While De Soto's theory has shown itself to be useful when
individual nation-state governments choose to reform, the IMF's
imposition of these reforms raises concerns about Argentina's
sovereign decision-making authority.225 Usually the IMF deals
with very specific macroeconomic reforms. 229 The IMF has fo-
cused intently on Argentine politicians' willingness to control
government spending.23° The IMF hoped that Argentina would
accept the need to control the spending and find a solution like
De Soto's on its own.23' But this is not how it has worked out.
For instance, Argentina has cut social services, exacerbating the
22
short-term pain of complying with the IMF's requirements.This usually results in calls for Argentina to refuse IMF man-
225. Id.
226. Press Release, Global Employer, Employee Registration And Social Secu-
rity Contributions (Jan. 2001), at http://www.shrmglobal.org/publications/baker
/0101glob/Jan%202001%20docs/argentina.htm.
227. This is because the employers would be required to fund social security
programs for employees in the formal sector.
228. Governments of countries such as Peru and the Philippines have used De
Soto's work to successfully increase the value of the formal economy in their coun-
tries. See Saadi, supra note 12.
229. For example, in previous agreements the IMF has required a stable cur-
rency and banking regulations. Development Finance - Old Battle, New Strategy,
supra note 25.
230. See Plumb, supra note 40.
231. See Rodrfquez, supra note 36.
232. See Klein, supra note 23 ("And if deeper cuts are made to the public sector,
as the IMF also is insisting, unemployed workers who account for between 20 and 30
per cent of the population, will have even less protection from the homelessness and
hunger that has led tens of thousands to storm supermarkets demanding food.").
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dates.23 The most recent rounds of discussions have not been
much different. The IMF has called on Argentina to reign in
government spending, and Argentina has refused.234 Many ob-
servers speculate that this is the cause of Argentina's failure to
come to a long-term agreement with the IMF.235
The concerns over state sovereignty are especially relevant
here because by mandating these reforms the IMF would be tak-
ing a new step into matters that are completely domestic.
However, reaching these policies is crucial to long-term sustain-
ability; integrating extralegal capital cannot be ignored.237
Thus, not requiring these structural reforms is the equivalent to
continually putting money into a bad investment. Without con-
sidering the structural problems, the SDRM is only rearranging, . 238
a payment system that is ultimately destined to fail. If the
IMF is going to mandate Argentina out of its current crisis it
should go beyond macroeconomic changes, and require reforms
to the fundamental structural problems in Argentina's political
and economic system.
239
Some critics claim that Argentina's failure to comply with
the IMF is due to a lack of political willpower.24 ° More than
most countries, interest groups that oppose the IMF's reforms
mark Argentina's political landscape. 24' Argentina's provinces
also control much of the government's spending.242 This makes
it difficult for the IMF to implement any reform on government
233. See id.
234. See Rodriquez, supra note 36.
235. See G7 Ready to Back Argentina If IMF Permits, CHANNEL NEwSASiA, Sept.
28, 2002 ("The IMF says the Argentine government has yet to come up with an eco-
nomic plan it can back with money, stressing the need to unravel a freeze on bank
deposits, and to win provincial government backing for restrained spending.").
236. In the current stand-by agreement with Argentina, the IMF has indicated
that it will require Argentina to enact fundamental structural reform. There is little
difference between conditioning aid on these reforms and conditioning aid on De
Soto's reforms. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
237. See DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 149-50.
238. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 201-10 and accompanying text.
240. See Lindsey, supra note 76.
241. See LATIN Focus, POLITICAL POWERS AND INTEREST GRoups, at
http://www.latin-focus.com/factsheets/argentina/argfact-pol-groups.htm (last visited
Feb. 12, 2003).
242. Andrew Walker, International Feud Threatens Argentina Deal, BBC NEWS
BUSINESS, Nov. 18, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2489947.stm (The
IMF has trouble dealing with the provinces "because some of them have been fund-
ing their spending by issuing what are in effect separate currencies. That in turn
makes it impossible for Argentina's central bank to control the amount of cash in
circulation.").
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spending, and these entities would likely oppose widespread
changes to property law and government institutions.242 More-
over, even when the country's political leaders were able to im-
plement some IMF reforms, the government could not control
lawmaking functions in areas like state spending, which has
been Argentina's problem all along.244 The power of Argentina's
provincial governments exacerbates this problem. The prov-
inces can broadly commit to new spending, but have never
bound themselves to restrict the rate of spending.245 The diffi-
culty in controlling provinces is another challenge to Argentina's
political will.
2 4
However, as the long as the IMF is working with Argentina
it must address the problems that result from the country's un-
willingness to reform. The SDRM program can deal with some
of the problems, but some incentive for structural reform to the
informal sector must be included.247 The IMF should put re-
forms similar to De Soto's on the table and require Argentina to
either begin a process of formalization and rooting out corrup-
tion or lose aid.245 It is then up to Argentina to decide whether
or not it will accept the IMF's assistance and mandates. 249 Just
as a bank requires borrowing countries to agree to requirements
before it receives funding, Argentina would either have to agree
to the IMF's rules or go somewhere else.25 °
Yet the IMF has an obligation to help its member coun-
tries,251 and it is therefore in a different situation than a private
bank or an aid organization.252 As a matter of its own purpose,
then, the IMF is obligated to work to find a solution with which
the Argentine government could politically agree. Nonetheless,
the IMF's ability to meet its obligation is still limited by the
willingness of national governments to follow its lead . 2 " The
IMF must define essential policy changes and then end mone-
243. Id.
244. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
246. See Walker, supra note 242.
247. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
248. Argentina's process could be similar to that of Peru and the Philippines.
See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 172; Villanueva, supra note 172; see also supra
notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
249. This is the kind of choice that some commentators feel that Argentina
should confront and refuse IMF aid. See HANKE & SCHULER, supra note 47.
250. See Lindsey, supra note 76.
251. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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tary aid when a country fails to implement those changes.254
Not doing this has only exacerbated Argentina's current depres-
255
sion.
One difficult choice for the IMF is how far it will extend into
the domestic affairs of a member country. Currently, the IMF
appears to be asking for incremental macro changes with hope
that Argentina will eventually adopt broader structural reforms,
perhaps implementing reforms similar to De Soto's recommen-
dations.256 However, because sustainable development is impos-
sible without a system to formalize property, Argentina will con-
tinue to experience problems while the informal sector remains
in place. 257 Any reform must address fundamental issues like
large public deficits, institutional corruption, and barriers to en-
terprise. Yet such reforms will be difficult if the national gov-
ernment does not have the political will to put them in place.259
Additionally, there are concerns about whether the IMF
could effectively implement De Soto's reforms, even if it wanted
to. De Soto views property ownership as rooted in a social con-
tract .26 0 The proper role for legal systems is recognizing existing
contracts. 6' The informal sector results from a government's
failure to acknowledge the social contracts that define relation-
262
ships for a large part of its economy. In this sense, reforms
must reflect how people actually live and interact.262  It seems
unlikely that the IMF could ever understand the social contracts
in the same manner national or local governments can.
C. WHAT CAN THE IMF Do?
The problems addressed here arise partly from the inherent
conflict in the IMF's role. The IMF "is expected to serve the in-
terests of its members, individually and collectively, by acting
254. See supra notes 30-32 and 51-58 and accompanying text.
255. See supra Part I.C.
256. The IMF either needs to do a better job of holding a country accountable for
not making agreed upon domestic reforms or end aid to non-complying countries.
See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
257. See supra Part II.
258. See supra note 126 and accompanying quote.
259. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
260. See DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 172.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 187. De Soto criticizes reformers for being too tied to Western
sources of law. Bringing extralegal capital into a country's formal economy requires
changing ownership laws to reflect how people actually live. Id.
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both as a sympathetic social worker and as a tough cop."264 The
IMF is expected to provide encouragement and monetary aid at
the same time it points out deficiencies in a country's economic
policies.2"5 For the IMF to help Argentina achieve De Soto's re-
forms, it must require that Argentina implement the policies,
and then enforce its agreement.266
Argentina's economic, political, and social structures need
De Soto's reforms, but the IMF can only go so far. If Argentina
will not implement De Soto's reforms, the IMF cannot do so with
measures short of establishing itself as the country's de facto
267 thgovernment. As the IMF pushes increasingly specific reforms
on Argentina, the more it erodes Argentina's sovereignty and
democracy.
Respecting state sovereignty, however, does not mean the
IMF should do nothing. Most commentators, as well as some
former IMF officials, have argued that the centerpiece of any
new reforms must be conditioned on policies that lead toward a
consistent economic policy for sustainable development.2 8
Therefore, the IMF should work with Argentina to begin a for-
malization process, similar to De Soto's policies in Peru. 26 9 The
IMF currently requires Argentina to agree to certain reforms
while new aid is extended. 270  An additional requirement for
formalization, however Argentina sees fit to implement it, would
begin the process of De Soto's reforms and not further infringe
on Argentina's sovereignty.271 Making a loose requirement to
begin a formalization process will offer Argentina a more sig-
nificant choice than ever before - either start the process of re-
form or lose IMF aid.272 The democratically elected government
of Argentina will again make its choice with respect to IMF re-
quirements and De Soto's reforms. It will live with the conse-
quences one way or the other.
264. MUSSA, supra note 1, at 67.
265. Id. at 67-68.
266. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
268. MUSSA, supra note 1, at 54.
269. See DE SOTO, supra note 11, at 160-61 (outlining De Soto's "capitalization"
process).
270. See supra notes 30-31, 92-96 and accompanying text.
271. This is not to say that the current infringements on sovereignty are not sig-
nificant. They are; however, the IMF is accountable for producing results through
its work with member countries. It is difficult to see how it can produce results by
never requiring any changes in the countries themselves. See supra notes 44-46 and
accompanying text.




There are no easy answers to Argentina's economic prob-
lems. However, any future solutions will probably involve addi-
tional loans from the IMF and require reforms from Argentina's
government. So far, the IMF's policy toward Argentina has not
resulted in sustainable economic growth because it has not ad-
dressed the root cause of the problem. The IMF's current solu-
tions will not be effective until they also require fundamental
reform in Argentina's legal and governmental institutions. The
state sovereignty concerns in this area are legitimate, but the
IMF has shown sensitivity to these issues in the past. It could
continue to do so now. De Soto's theory shows why a capitaliza-
tion process is needed, and how it should be implemented.
Many individual governments have been successful in drawing
extralegal capital into the formal economy. To truly help devel-
oping countries like Argentina take advantage of the wealth
that exists in its own informal sector, the IMF should require De
Soto's reforms.
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